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Chapter pages in book: (p. 51 - 57)increase in the ratio of stocks to sales on all market levels in the
last few months of the year, which suggests that the rise in inven-
tory investment in the fourth quarter may have been unplanned.
Perhaps a period of voluntary inventory disinvestment would have
followed had the United States not entered the war in December.
TheExpansion of 1940—1941: Government
Operations and Supply Bottlenecks
Afederal deficit existed in 1940, but it was partially offset by a
surplus on state and local government account.27 The federal def-
icit grew more rapidly than the state and local surplus in 1941, so
that the combined deficit increased sixfold. The quarterly figures
(Table 4) demonstrate that the combined deficit did not become
large until the last half, and particularly the last quarter, of 1941.
Nonetheless, the growing deficit was adding to the inflationary
pressure after the first quarter of the year, at the very time when
prices began their rapid climb.
The mobilization effort of 1940—1941 would probably have pro-
moted an increase in total spending even had federal expenditures
been financed by noninflationary means. Part of the 25 per cent
increase in real private investment during 1941 was the direct re-
sult of the mobilization program. Mobilization for war production
required an expansion of industrial facilities, not only in the arma-
ment industries, but in basic industries as well; iron and steel, non-
ferrous metals, and machine tools were the most important. About
half the fixed capital outlay in manufacturing in 1941 was in arms
17). The decline in sales may have been a reaction to forward buying by consumers,
but there is no evidence of extensive forward buying; retail sales merely rose propor-
tionally with personal income up to September.
27 The figures, in billions of dollars, are as follows:
1939 1940 1911 1942
Government deficit (+) or surplus (—) +1.87 +0.55 +3.49 +31.16
Federal +2.21 +1.41 +4.89 +32.95
State and local —0.35 —0,86 —1.40 —1.79
Source: National Income Supplement, 1951, Survey of Current Business, Table 5.
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mentGovern-Deficit (+) Gross to GNP
Year and Expendi-mentorSurplus(—) National(per cent)
Quarter turesReceipts (2 —3)Product (4 ÷ 5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1939 I 3.8 +0.4 21.6 +1.9
H 4.4 3.7 +0.7 21.8 +8.2
III 4.1 3.8 +0.3 22.9 +1.3
IV 4.4 4.0 +0.4 25.0 +1.6
1940 I 4.4 4.4 0.0 24.0 0.0
II 4.6 4.8 +0.3 24.3 +1.2
III 4.4 4.4 0.0 25.0 0.0
IV 5.0 4.8 +0.2 28.1 +0.7
1941 I 5.8 5.9 —0.1 27.7 —0.4
II 63 6.2 +0.8 30.4 +L0
Iii 7.3 6.4 +0.9 32.1 +2.8
IV 9.2 6.5 +2.7 36.2 +7.5
1942 I 10.7 8.8 +1.9 35.3 +5-4
II 14.6 7.9 +6.7 38.5 +17.4
III 18.1 8.1 +10..0 41.7 +24.0
IV 20.6 8.0 +12.6 46.1 +27.3
Note: The annual totals of the quarterly figures in column 4 may differ from the
values in footnote 27 because of rounding of the quarterly components of columns
2 and 5.
Source: National Income Supplement, 1951, Survey of Current Business. Government
Expenditures is the sum of Government Purchases of Goods and Services (Table 42)
and Government Transfer Payments, Net Interest Paid by Government, and Subsi-
dies less Current Surplus of Government Enterprises (Table 46). Government Re-
ceipts is the sum of Personal Tax and Nontax Payments (Table 44), Corporate Profits
Tax Liability (Table 40), and Indirect Business Tax and Nontax Liability and Con-
tributions for Social Insurance (Table 46).
industries, one-fourth in basic industries, and one-fourth in civil-
ian industries.28 Although the largest part of the investment for
defense was financed by government (about two-thirds of industrial
28 Survey ofCurrent Business, February1942, p. 6.
52construction, including nine-tenths of the armament plant, was
on federal account in 1941),29someof it was privately financed.
Again, part of the large increase in inventory investment during
this period was in the form of materials and products which would
eventually be purchased on government account.
Since part of the increased expenditures contingent on defense
production supplemented rather than replaced other expenditures,
total spending and hence disposable income increased. The growth
of income induced additional consumer spending, which in turn
encouraged inventory investment by consumer goods industries
and the distributive trades. The previous discussion revealed no
evidence of extensive speculative inventory accumulation by con-
sumers or distributors. However, the vigorous rise in disposable
income ensured a continuous growth in consumer demand even
though personal saving absorbed a large and increasing fraction of
the consumer's dollar. Given the inflationary impact of investment
and government expenditures, a considerably higher saving ratio
would have been required to produce a softening of consumer
demand comparable to that which occurred in 1951.
Rigorous government controls were not used to moderate the
pace of expansion until late in 1941. Stringent controls were nei-
ther desirable nor politically feasible during the first year of the
mobilization. Nearly 15 per cent of the civilian labor force was
unemployed in the second quarter of 1940, just before the defense
expansion began. With so much slack in the economy, the in-
creased spending which accompanied the rise in defense expen-
ditures was all to the good, since it promoted an expansion of
production and employment. Production grew much more rap-
idly than prices in the first half of the period. However, after the
first few months of 1941, prices began to climb rapidly, notwith-
standing the fact that 11 per cent of the civilian labor force was
then seeking employment. Supply bottlenecks were beginning to
develop in many sectors of the economy.
The ratio of unemployed to labor force probably gives a
misleading impression of the volume of unutilized productive
29Ibid.,p.37.
53capacity in 1941. This ratio is not an index of unutilized capacity,
although it is no doubt ordinarily true that when unemployment
is large, surplus capacity exists in most sectors of the economy.
Nonetheless, ten of a group of fifteen industries for which data
are available operated at a higher percentage of capacity in 1941
than in 1929, while the percentages for most of the other five were
only slightly lower (Table 5), despite the fact that 9 per cent of
the civilian labor force was.unemployed in 1941 and only 3 per
cent in At the least, these figures indicate that production
was pressing heavily on capacity in some sectors of the economy
in 1941. At the most, they suggest that the growth of the labor
force may have exceeded the growth of plant and equipment in
the economy during the depression decade, so that an unemploy-
ment ratio of 9 per cent in 1941 may not imply as much unused
capacity as would have accompanied the same amount of unem-
ployment in 1929.
It is a familiar proposition that supply bottlenecks may develop
during any general expansion of economic activity before full
employment is reached. The nature of defense mobilization is
such that bottlenecks may easily develop while a large fraction of
the labor force is still unemployed. Supplies of metals may prove
inadequate at an early date, since metals are so necessary to the
production of modern munitions. Perhaps more important in
1940—1941 was the fact that the United States had not maintained
a sizable peacetime military establishment. Mobilization required
large expenditures for military construction and for the estab-
lishment of facilities to produce munitions. The mobilization
program thus called for the large-scale consumption of resources
important in the production of durable commodities. In the first
year or so of the expansion, defense production did not interfere
with civilian production, but after mid-1941 the production of
materials used in construction and in the manufacture of durable
30 The data from which these unemployment percentages were computed are based
on the 1940 labor-force concept. (The quarterly data previously used were based on
the 1945 concept.) They were obtained from Frederick C. Mills, who developed an•
nual series by a process of interpolation from the estimates for census years made by
Clarence D. Long, who had adjusted the original census data for comparability.
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CAPACITY AND PERCENTAGE OF CAPACITY UTILIZED, SELECTED
INDUSTRiES, 1929 AND 1941
PERCENTAGE OF
CAPACITY a CAPACITY UTILIZED
INDUSTRY 1929 1941 1929 1941
1.Beehive coke 21.1 10.0 30.7 67.0
2. Byproduct coke 59.9 62.5 89.2 93.6
3. Pig iron 57.6 59.0 82.2 94.8
4. Steel ingots 72.2 86.4 87.5 95.9
5. Electrolytic copper 152.3 155.5 94.4 92.9
6. Portland cement 252.5 250.8 67.6 65.4
7. Petroleum refining 348.0 433.9 77.8 89.0
8. Paper 13.7 18.5 81.3 95.9
9. Wheat flour 201.5 177.4 57.2 59.8
10. Electric power 252.5 360.6 36.5 45.7
II. Black blasting powder 245.5 167.0 .39.2 36.9
12. High explosives 525.9 608.0 65.1 77.3
13. Cotton spinning 96.1 100.6 103.6 111.1
a For units of capacity see notes below.
Source and notes: All capacity data have been centered on the middle of the year.
Production for the year has been divided by capacity to yield the percentage of
capacity utilized.
Line
1. For 1929, E. G. Nourse and Associates, America's Capacity to Produce, Brookings
Institution, 1934; for 1941, Minerals Yearbook, Bureau of Mines, 1949. Millions
of tons.
2. Ibid. Millions of tons.
3. Annual Statistical Report, American Iron and Steel Institute, 1949. Millions of
tonS.
4. Ibid. Millions of tons.
5. For 1929, Nourse, op.cit.;for 1941, Yearbook of the American Bureau of Metal
Statistics, 1945. Thousands of tons.
6. For 1929, Nourse, op. cit.; for 1941, Minerals Yearbook. Thousands of barrels.
7. Ibid. Thousands of barrels of crude run to stills per day.
8. Statistics of the Paper Industry, 1951, American Paper and Pulp Association,
Millions of tons.
9. Wheat Ground and Wheat Milling Products, Bureau of the Census, various
issues. Millions of barrels.
10. Statistical Bulletin, 1951, Edison Electric Institute.Billions of kilowatt hours.
(Capacity in kilowatts multiplied by 8,760 hours in leap years and 8,784 hours
in other years.)
11. Production of Industrial Explosives, 1943, Bureau of Mines, Technical Paper
No. 665. Millions of pounds. (Production in pounds divided by utilization ratio.)
12. Ibid. Millions of pounds. (See preceding note.)
13. Cotton Production and Distribution, Bureau of the Census, 1943.Billions of
spindle-hours on double-shift basis. (Spindle-hours run divided by activity ratio.
The single-shift estimate for 1929 has been converted to the double.shift basis.)
55goods could no longer expand fast enough to supply the combined
public and private demand. Accordingly, direct controls were used
to limit the output of many finished consumer goods and to curtail
nonessential fixed investment in the last half of the year.
Despite the tight physical-supply situation in durable commodi-
ties, during 1941 the gains in the wholesale-price indexes of metals
and metal products and of building materials were much smaller
than those recorded by nondurable commodities (Table 6).In
TABLE 6









Chemicals and drugs 16.2
Fuel and lighting materials 8.7
Hides and leather products 12.1
Textile products 22.1
Metals and metal products 5.7
House-furnishing goods 13.6
Miscellaneous 13.6
Source: Survey of Current Business, February 1942, Table 6.
part, this was a normal development—the prices of farm products
ordinarily fluctuate more widely than those of industrial products
over the business cycle. However, the structure of prices was also
consciously altered by government policy. The Office of Price Ad-
ministration sought the voluntary cooperation of producers in an
effort to retard the advance of metal prices, while at the same time
the government took steps to raise the prices of important farm
products in an effort to encourage an expansion of output for
export to the Allies and for consumption at home. A consider-
able number of foods and basic agricultural staples were directly
56affected by the latter program.31 The prices of farm products and
of related foods and textiles recorded the largest gains of the year,
under the combined influence of the increase in aggregate demand
and of the special conditions created by war, including the gov-
ernment's farm-price policy.
In 1940—1941, then, the rise in spending for defense purposes
promoted an expansion in total spending which was largely uncon-
trolled until late in 1941. Prices did not begin to rise sharply until
the simultaneous expansion of government and private spending
had taken up the slack in unutilized capacity that existed at the
beginning of the expansion, but inflationary pressures were un-
abated thereafter. In these respects the expansion progressed as
theory and the observation of peacetime expansions would suggest.
The surprising developments of the Korean period appear all the
more unusual when viewed against this background.
Postscript:War and Peace Cycles
Broadlyconceived, war is simply one of a number of external
forces that may impinge on an economy and thereby modify the
direction and pace of economic activity. The peculiar feature that
distinguishes war from other external forces is the magnitude of
the claim exerted by the state on the nation's resources. Once
committed to mobilization, whether for defense or active warfare,
the ordinary restraints on government spending must be brushed
aside. An important new demand force is created, a force not con-
strained by income limitations or the need to estimate the poten-
tial profitability of economic decisions. This is the basic fact that
gives war cycles their family resemblance and sets them apart from
peace cycles. However, war cycles bear only a family resemblance
—significant differences are observable in the economic develop-
ments associated with World War I, World War H, and the Korean
War. The implications of those differences must be taken into
account in any comparison of war and peace cycles.
31Amongthe commodities affected were hogs, evaporated milk, cheese, chickens and
eggs, a number of vegetables, wheat, corn, cotton, tobacco, and rice.Cf. Survey of
Current Business, February 1942, pp. 29—30.
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